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INTRODUCTION
Here is a wild thought: if you were born in 1880 and lived to be at
least eighty-nine years old, you would live until 1969. That means in
your lifetime you would have gone from riding horses and carriages as
a young child, to seeing the United States (U.S.) put a man on the moon.
Consider how drastic that progress was for humankind. Now, fifty
years later, in 2019, we are hearing about plans for space tourism and
colonizing Mars. 1 So, we must ask: How much further will we go?
How fast will it happen? How will our society possibly keep up with
the expeditious growth of technology?
The twentieth century was the birth of the space age where the most
powerful nations of Earth accomplished unimaginable feats of genius.
Based on what we have seen so far, in the twenty-first century we will
witness the birth of a new space age dominated by private actors and
commercial ventures, rather than by governments and nations.
As exciting as this may seem, many risks come with the increased
commercialization of space by private actors; our society may not be
readily equipped to address those risks. Outer space has untapped
1. See Tariq Malik, Elon Musk Unveils SpaceX’s New Starship Plans for Private
Trips to the Moon, Mars and Beyond, SPACE, https://www.space.com/elon-muskunveils-spacex-starship-2019-update.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
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potential that can be revolutionary to humankind or potentially
destructive. The truth is that we will not know the potential of
commercializing space until we fully understand space. This dilemma
raises the question: If we do not understand outer space, how are we
supposed to regulate it? This problem is magnified when we realize
that we cannot even come to an agreement on current world problems;
so, how are we supposed to agree on the unknown?
This comment discusses the current state of domestic and
international space law and how we got to the status quo. It assesses
where space law has succeeded and failed to illustrate how we can
create a new and improved regulatory scheme building on lessons we
have learned. It is imperative that we find a new regulatory structure.
A recent surge in the use of space by private actors has presented new
issues that must be addressed. Our current platform for regulation, both
domestically and internationally, has failed to adequately address the
growing concerns associated with the increased commercialization of
space. Therefore, we need a new regulatory platform that can garner
universal support and cooperation.
Part I discusses the evolution of space law, both domestically and
internationally. It examines the political and economic forces that drive
the current state of space law. The discussion focuses on the gradual
commercialization of space, which strays from the original provisions
of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), formerly known as the international
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies. Moreover, Part I also illustrates that there is a need
for increased regulation of space commercialization because the OST
lacks any binding international authority to enforce its provisions.
Part II focuses on specific factors that made the OST successful.
Further, it analyzes other international treaties to determine how the
presence or absence of such factors may have contributed to the success
or failure of those treaties. Ultimately, this analysis aims to identify the
key components for creating a successful agreement among the
international community to effectively regulate an increasingly
commercialized outer space.
Part III proceeds to offer a new platform to regulate space on a
domestic and international level. The factors that were critical to the
success of past treaties is used as the foundation for this new regulatory
platform. Finally, I apply the platform to the current state of the space
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industry and international law to illustrate how this regulatory scheme
would work in practice.
The world is not equipped to face the new challenges that will soon
arise from the exponential increase in space activity. Therefore, it is
time to reinvent the wheel (or the spaceship equivalent of the wheel).
I. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF SPACE LAW AND THE PUSH
TOWARD COMMERCIALIZATION
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the United States and
the Soviet Union dominated outer space exploration. During the Cold
War, tensions between the two superpowers grew. In response, in a
1967 agreement, the United Nations established a set of international
guidelines for the use of space under the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, otherwise known as the
Outer Space Treaty (OST). 2 The treaty serves as the foundation of
international space law to promote the peaceful use of space and
progress for all humankind.
The international community has widely accepted the OST.
Subsequent agreements were established to elaborate on the OST’s
intentions and to reaffirm the major issues that arise with the use of
space. However, as international interests changed over time, space law
began to transition from international cooperation to domestic
legislation within each spacefaring 3 nation, using the OST as a
guideline.
Conflicting, and often polarizing, national interests resulted in
different interpretations of the OST and inconsistency in the regulation
of space. This has become a greater problem now because of the rapid
commercialization of space, which increased the number of actors
engaged in space activity. This section discusses the evolution of space
law toward a new era of space commercialization.
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
3. Spacefaring nations are nations that “hav[e] vehicles capable of traveling
beyond the earth’s atmosphere.” Spacefaring, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spacefaring (last visited Apr. 11,
2019).
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A. Evolution of Space Law Toward Commercialization
One of the most successful treaties to govern international space
law is the OST, which went into effect on October 10, 1967. 4 As of
2019, there are 109 parties to the treaty, and eighty-nine other countries
have signed the treaty but have not fully ratified it. 5
1. The Birth of the Outer Space Treaty
The OST was a response to the growing tensions and major
concerns of the Cold War Era. 6 The OST’s narrow focus left the
remainder of space law issues largely unregulated. 7 The OST was born
in a time when major issues surrounding the Cold War needed to be
addressed on an international level. 8 In the time leading up to the
OST’s formation, the world had experienced World War II’s
devastating impact. Following the war, two superpowers emerged with
a drastic divergence in ideology: western capitalism in the United States
and communism in the Soviet Union. 9

4. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2. See also Christopher D. Johnson, The Outer
Space Treaty at 50,
THE SPACE REVIEW (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3155/1 (“As a successful undertaking in
international diplomacy, and one that helped foster the global development of outer
space as a realm of humankind’s activities, the importance of [the OST’s opening for
signature] warrants reflection.”).
5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Status of the
Treaty, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space (last visited Oct.
17, 2019).
6. Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can It Survive a New Space
Race?, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/outer_space_treaty.
7. See id. (“[T]he [OST] was very much written to address military, scientific
and political questions—not with commercial interests in mind. As a result, there is
no framework for regulating or managing commercial actors in space. ‘The document
mentions “nongovernmental agencies” only once,’ Gabrynowicz says. ‘And because
of that oversight, there is no U.S. agency with jurisdiction of on-orbit activity. That’s
a big gap in the law.’”).
8. Arguably, the potential of devastating nuclear war was an international issue
that required international cooperation. See id.
9. Erin Blakemore, What Was the Cold War?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 22,
2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/reference/cold-war/.
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As tensions increased during the 1950s and 1960s, the two
superpowers engaged in both a nuclear arms and space race. 10 During
this time, major concerns arose at the United Nations regarding the
outer space rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. 11 This
rivalry created an urgent need to promote international cooperation and
peace. 12 The Cuban Missile Crisis was a catalyst for addressing these
concerns. 13 The Cuban Missile Crisis was a nuclear standoff between
the United States and the Soviet Union from October 16, 1962, to
October 28, 1962. 14 At that time, the two superpowers came the closest
to escalating their ideological conflict into a full scale nuclear war than
at any other time during the Cold War. 15
Soon after the crisis, the United Nations General Assembly
(Assembly) met on November 21, 1962, to discuss its concern of
“avert[ing] the grave dangers to the human race of nuclear
confrontation . . . .” 16 A few weeks later, on December 14, 1962, the
United Nations “urgently” requested the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space “[to] work on the further elaboration of basic legal
principles governing the activity of States in the exploration and use of
outer space . . . and on other legal problems.” 17 About a year later, on
December 13, 1963, the Assembly submitted a Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use

10. See id.
11. See generally G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), (Dec. 13, 1958); G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), (Dec. 12, 1959); G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), (Dec. 20, 1961); G.A. Res. 1802
(XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res. 1962-63 (XVIII), (Dec. 13, 1963); G.A. Res. 2130
(XX), (Dec. 21, 1965).
12. See generally G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), (Dec. 13, 1958); G.A. Res. 1472
(XIV), (Dec. 12, 1959); G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), (Dec. 20, 1961); G.A. Res. 1802
(XVII), (Dec. 19, 1962); G.A. Res. 1962-63 (XVIII), (Dec. 13, 1963); G.A. Res. 2130
(XX), (Dec. 21, 1965).
13. The Cuban Missile Crisis catalyzed the need to address these concerns
because it was the closest the superpowers came to actual nuclear conflict. Blakemore,
supra note 9.
14. See Patrick J. Kiger, Key Moments in the Cuban Missile Crisis, HISTORY
(June 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/cuban-missile-crisis-timeline-jfkkhrushchev.
15. Blakemore, supra note 9.
16. G.A. Res. 1767 (XVII), (Nov. 21, 1962).
17. G.A. Res. 1802(I)(3) (XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962).
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of Outer Space, 18 which laid out many of the principles that would later
be included in the OST. The Assembly discussed its intent for the treaty
to function as an agreement to promote progress and the peaceful use
of outer space for the benefit of all humankind, regardless of a nation’s
economic or scientific development. 19 Over time, change in the
political and economic climate of the world led to differing interests
among nations. These competing interests ultimately affected the way
space law developed.
2. Subsequent Treaties to the Outer Space Treaty
The OST served its purpose of regulating space law by addressing
the Cold War concerns, promoting the peaceful cooperation in the use
of outer space, and preventing a potential nuclear war. Over time,
subsequent treaties continued to focus on these concerns. In 1967, the
Assembly established the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Rescue Agreement). 20 The Rescue Agreement elaborates on
Article V of the OST, which requires nations to assist each other in
rescuing astronauts in distress and in recovering space objects to return
them to their respective nations. 21 Later in 1972, the United Nations
established the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects treaty (Liability Convention). 22 The Liability
Convention expanded Article VII of the OST regarding liability of
states for damages caused by their own space objects. 23 In 1976, the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Registration Convention) went into effect, which requires states to
register and provide information to the United Nations about the space

18. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), (Dec. 13, 1963).
19. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 1966).
20. G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), (Dec. 19, 1967); Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
21. See Rescue Agreement; see also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. V.
22. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
23. Id. See also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII.
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objects that they have in orbit around the Earth or beyond. 24 All of
these agreements promoted further collaboration between states by
making space exploration activity more accessible and transparent.
However, the most recent international space treaty did not gain
much acceptance as space law transitioned away from international
regulation toward domestic law. This treaty was the Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Agreement), which consists of only eighteen State
Parties. 25 Neither the United States nor any major spacefaring nation
is a party to the agreement. 26 The Moon Agreement, effective July 11,
1984, grants jurisdictional control of all celestial bodies to international
law, and it reaffirms the use of celestial bodies and their natural
resources for the benefit of all mankind. 27 The Moon Agreement’s
failed attempt to promote the idea of non-appropriation of property in
space illustrates that nations realized space’s potential and deviated
from international collaboration toward commercialization of space.
3. Current U.S. Space Law
The OST has always served as a guideline for nations to develop
their own domestic law, especially as space law shifted from
24. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov. 12,
1974, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
25. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]; see also
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies:
Status of the Treaty, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon (last visited
Oct. 18, 2019).
26. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial
Bodies:
Status
of
the
Treaty,
UNODA,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); see also
Shekhar Chandra, India’s “Vyomanauts” Seek to Join the Elite Club of Spacefaring
AMERICAN
(Aug.
23,
2018),
Nations
by
2022,
SCI.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/india-rsquo-s-ldquo-vyomanauts-rdquoseek-to-join-the-elite-club-of-spacefaring-nations-by-2022/ (stating that the United
States, Russia, and China are the only countries to have successfully achieved
spaceflight).
27. See generally Moon Treaty, supra note 25 (stating that the “exploration and
use of the Moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development”).
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international treaties to domestic legislation. As this transition
occurred, the OST’s lack of binding authority led to different
interpretations of its vague language. As a result, international
cooperation faded, and nations developed their own domestic space law
to align with their own interests. This transition toward domestic space
law eventually led to a focus on the commercialization of space as
private actors became increasingly involved in the space industry.
The first sign of this push for commercialization of space was when
most spacefaring nations refused to sign the Moon Agreement. 28 This
refusal was based on the agreement’s intended purpose to expand
international authority in space. 29 The expansion of international
authority would limit the ability of individual nations to pursue their
respective interests in commercial space ventures.
It has been predicted that “[r]ather than amend[ing] the treaty,
space-faring nations like the United States will likely pass legislation to
authorize and supervise space activities.” 30 For example, instead of
signing the Moon Agreement in 1984, the United States passed the
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984. 31 Under this act, private
entities were permitted to launch vehicles into space for the first time,
expanding the space industry beyond the government’s exclusive use, 32
but this transition was a gradual process. Moreover, until the passing
of the Asteroids Act in 2014, private space activity was limited to the
use of satellites. 33 The Asteroids Act expanded private actors’ freedom
in space to “facilitate the commercial exploration and utilization of

28. See Krause, supra note 6; see also Rachel Mitchell, Into the Final Frontier:
The Expanse of Space Commercialization, 83 MO. L. REV. 429, 436 (2018).
29. The agreement “calls for the establishment of an international regime to
govern exploitation of the Moon’s resources.” See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 435.
30. Krause, supra note 6.
31. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984)
(codified as 51 U.S.C. § 50901, et seq. (2010)).
32. Id.
33. See American Bar Ass’n, Space Law Then, Now, and in the Future: A
Conversation with Pamela Meredith and Laura Montgomery, 30 AIR & SPACE
LAWYER NO. 4 (2017), https://www.kmazuckert.com/publications/space/
ABA_AirSpaceLawyer_v030n04_Meredith_Montgomery.pdf (stating that there has
been a push to allow private actors to own commercial extractions from asteroids and
the Moon) [hereinafter American Bar Ass’n].
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asteroid resources to meet national needs.” 34 This law allowed the
government to collaborate with private entities to harness the
commercial potential of space. 35 Finally, in 2015, the United States
passed the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, also
known as the SPACE Act. 36 This act allows private actors to obtain
property rights over the resources they mine from asteroids. 37
As of today, the United States has the most developed space
regulation framework in the world. 38 For this reason, countries such as
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan have discussed integrating U.S.
space law into their own legal systems. 39 Moreover, the SPACE Act,
among other factors, has catalyzed the emergence of a new space
industry as private entities develop the technology to explore and
harness the potential of space.
B. Factors Contributing to Increased Commercialization
Throughout the twentieth century, space exploration and travel was
largely a race between superpower nations. However, in recent years,
companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic have been
racing to establish commercial space ventures for tourism, mining, and
other endeavors. 40 Therefore, it is no surprise that when the SPACE
Act was enacted in 2015, the space industry grew to $323 billion. 41
Besides the SPACE Act, there are several reasons space
34. Asteroids Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. (2014). The Asteroids Act became
part of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. See generally
Matthew Shaer, The Asteroid Miner’s Guide to the Galaxy, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 28,
2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/28/the-asteroid-miners-guide-to-thegalaxy-space-race-mining-asteroids-planetary-research-deep-space-industries/.
35. See Asteroids Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted) (stating that its
purpose is to “facilitate the commercial exploration and utilization of asteroid
resources . . . [by] discourag[ing] government barriers to the development of
economically viable, safe, and stable industries . . . ”).
36. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
129 Stat. 704 (2015) (enacted).
37. Id.
38. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
39. Id.
40. Krause, supra note 6.
41. W. P. Carey School, The Business of Space, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://medium.com/w-p-carey-magazine/the-business-of-space-2389ed011d7c.
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commercialization has expanded rapidly from satellites in 1984, to
mining operations today and tourism in the near future.
1. NASA’s Reliance on Private Actors
Currently, the U.S. government is more involved with private space
ventures by encouraging the private sector’s involvement in space
through funding and legislation. 42 Private actors must be on the
forefront of space exploration as government funding for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) dwindles. 43 There is
uncertainty about NASA’s ability to continue its progress in space
considering lack of funding. For example, in 2011, the Space Shuttle
Program, the successor to NASA’s Apollo missions that put a man on
the moon, ended. 44 Further, NASA’s financially difficulties are
impeding its ability to afford the cost of ferrying astronauts to the
International Space Station (ISS). 45
As a result, the U.S. government has taken steps to encourage and
facilitate companies such as Boeing and SpaceX to develop technology
that would make “space more accessible from an operational and cost
perspective.” 46 The government has thus prioritized the commercial
space industry’s growth by offering various private contracts. 47 For
example, NASA contracted with SpaceX and Boeing to develop better

42. See Prospects for Space Exploration: Economic and Strategic Assessment,
BUS. WIRE (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20190327005644/en/Prospects-Space-Exploration-Economic-StrategicAssessment—.
43. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (explaining that NASA’s contracts
with private companies such as SpaceX and Boeing are not being adequately funded).
44. Space Shuttle Era, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/
flyout/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
45. Part of the Space Shuttle program was to shuttle astronauts to space who
could complete the ISS, but the program became too costly. See Michele Lerner, Why
Did NASA End the Space Shuttle Program?, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/02/02/why-did-nasa-end-the-spaceshuttle-program/#434f2616799f.
46. One example of this technology is reusable rockets. American Bar Ass’n,
supra note 33.
47. By involving private entities, the government can lower its costs. This
means it has an incentive to prioritize private contracts over conducting the activities
itself. See Lerner, supra note 45.
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technology to facilitate the transportation of U.S. astronauts to the
ISS. 48 This collaboration created “a high degree of collegiality and
interchange between government and the private sector . . . .” 49
Although funding shortfalls have caused difficulties for U.S. space
exploration, NASA’s attempt to encourage private sector participation
in space ventures will allow the United States to continue pursuing its
interests in outer space.
2. Collapse of the Soviet Union
The end of the Cold War allowed more collaboration in the
international space community. “The breakup of the Soviet Union and
the creation of new East-West ventures . . . contributed greatly to . . .
space law practice.” 50 Together with the emergence of the private
sector, this new collaborative environment made space travel more
feasible and affordable. 51
For example, after the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States
began working with private Russian companies with access to launch
technology because it was less expensive to launch from Russia. 52
However, now that the private space industry has rapidly grown,
driving costs down in the United States, some experts believe it is better
to spend the money on private U.S. companies. 53 Shifting these
investments would likely increase the presence of U.S. companies in
outer space and help the United States maintain its own interests.
3. Economic Potential
Worldwide, the potential for private actors and more countries to
participate in space ventures because of various factors has increased;

48. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. This feasibility and affordability can also be attributed to an overall increase
in global space budgets due to an increased involvement of private actors with
government entities. See BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.
52. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
53. See id. (stating that although U.S. companies should be in charge of
servicing the ISS, there is still no adequate funding from the government; therefore,
the United States still relies on Russian companies).
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one of those factors is a decrease in the cost of building and launching
satellites. 54 According to a March 2019 report by Prospects for Space
Exploration, “[g]lobal government investment in space exploration
totaled $14.6 billion in 2017, a 6% increase compared to 2016.” 55 The
rapid increase in funding and investing in space commercialization will
likely see this projection grow exponentially in the near future.
To put this increase into perspective, in the last decade alone, there
were nineteen space exploration missions conducted by six global
powers, including the United States, European Union, Russia, Japan,
China, and India. 56 Now, with the inclusion of private actors in space
ventures, either through independent ventures or government contracts,
this number is expected to increase to eighty missions over the next
decade. 57 Of this estimate, only sixty-three percent will be government
missions, while the remainder of the missions will be conducted by
private companies. 58 Two private companies, Deep Space Industries
and Planetary Resources, are developing plans to mine asteroids using
robots, 59 which could be an extremely lucrative venture. It is estimated
that an asteroid the size of a football field can potentially contain up to
$50 billion worth of platinum. 60
C. Problems with Space Law: Regulation of Commercialization
A rapid increase in commercialization has generated concerns over
the current state of space law and its ability to regulate such an
expanding industry. International law is vague regarding commercial
space regulation because the OST was a product of Cold War mentality,

54. Id.
55. PROSPECTS FOR SPACE EXPL., PROSPECTS FOR SPACE EXPLORATION REPORT
2019
(2019),
https://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/8xmjbj/
global_market?w=5 (on file with author). “Prospects for Space Exploration is an
economic and strategic assessment of the space exploration sector, including an
analysis and benchmark of government and commercial space exploration programs
worldwide.” See also BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.
56. BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.
57. Id.
58. About thirty of the eighty expected missions will be commercial. See id.
59. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
60. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 441.
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which does not take into consideration contemporaneous issues. 61
“[T]he treaty was very much written to address military, scientific and
political questions — not with commercial interests in mind.” 62
For example, the OST does not clearly address the process that will
apply when there is a dispute between two parties in space:
It’s not clear which international court would be called on to settle a
dispute in space. In order to fully address these and other concerns,
the U.N. would need to amend existing treaties or draft new ones.
That would likely be the only way to create binding legal opinions
in space law, but in the current political climate, there is little
political will or interest in new treaties. 63

Still, it is more problematic that the OST only applies to states that
are parties to the treaty, not commercial actors. 64 As a result, there is
no international “framework for regulating or managing commercial
actors in space[,]” and such actors are largely regulated through
domestic law. 65
However, domestic law has expanded
commercialization beyond the scope of the OST and has created
conflicting interpretations of the OST’s guidelines because they are too
vague and unenforceable; the result is less cooperation among the
international community to regulate the commercial space industry.
D. Regulation Under Article VI
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty serves as the “foundation on
which any laws or regulations regarding commercial space activity are

61. The major concern during the Cold War era was preventing mass destruction
through nuclear disarmament. Therefore, there are large gaps in space law regarding
certain activities such as commercialization. See Krause, supra note 6.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI.
65. See Krause, supra note 6 (arguing that countries like the United States will
likely pass laws and regulations to address space activity due to gaps in the OST, such
as addressing commercial actors).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss1/8

14

Harper: Planetary Protection: A New Launch Pad for the Regulation of the
Harper camera ready (Do Not Delete)

2019]

1/18/2020 11:08 AM

PLANETARY PROTECTION

221

erected.” 66 The United States can use Article VI as a tool for regulating
private actors in space because the article states in pertinent part that
activities of government and private civilians must be authorized and
supervised by their respective governments if they are to undertake any
venture in space. 67
However, Article VI is vague as to private actors’ involvement in
space because the regulation of commercialization was not the original
intent behind the OST. 68 The treaty was drafted during the emergence
of the space industry, so certain issues surrounding the regulation of
private space actors were neglected and later regulated by domestic
law. 69 Perhaps the greatest problem is that domestic space law must
conform with the OST, which means disagreement over the vague
interpretation of the OST has slowed the progress toward effective
regulation.
For example, some people argue for a narrow interpretation that
Article VI is not enforceable in United States because the provision is
not self-executing, meaning Congress should only regulate when space
activity poses a dangerous threat to humankind. 70 Conversely, some
argue for a broader interpretation that Congress should regulate all
private space activity because the government is responsible for the
activities of its private entities under Article VI. 71 Depending on the
interpretation taken, Article VI can have drastically different results,

66. Id.
67. “This does not mean a State like the United States is compelled to authorize
a private space activity but rather permits a State to allow non-government entities to
perform space activities.” See Michael J. Listner, A Reality Check on Article VI and
Private Space Activities, SPACE NEWS (June 6, 2017), https://spacenews.com/areality-check-on-article-vi-and-private-space-activities/; see also Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 2, art. VI.
68. Krause, supra note 6 (discussing that the original intent of the OST was to
address scientific, military, and political questions).
69. For example, because the OST did not address commercial actors, the
United States passed the SPACE Act, which allowed the commercial exploration and
exploitation of space resources. See id.
70. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a non-self-executing treaty cannot
be enforced in the United States. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
71. One of the previous Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) had proposed
that everything in space should be regulated. See id.; see also Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 2, art. VI.
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illustrating “considerable regulatory uncertainty.” 72 To add to the
uncertainty, many of the new proposed private space activities do not
necessarily fit into the traditional regulatory scope of existing U.S.
agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Federal
Communications Commission (FCC); thus, there is much overlap in
what agency regulates what activity. 73
The attempt to use Article VI to regulate private commercial actors
in space has failed. “The big issue going forward is whether and how
to regulate . . . new space activities.” 74 Even if the United States can
successfully establish its own domestic law, without a strong
international framework for regulation, the United States will still face
international and domestic scrutiny for regulation of its commercial
actors under the provisions of the OST.” 75
Since the OST’s ratification in 1967, international interests have
transitioned from focusing on Cold War concerns regarding nuclear
prevention to prioritizing commercial interests in space. This new
focus has rested largely on a broad interpretation of Article VI of the
OST, which was not created with the intent of regulating private actors.
Article VI regulation has also proved ineffective because of the vast
disagreement regarding its interpretation and application. Therefore, it
is both necessary and urgent to develop a new platform.
II. A NEED FOR REGULATION
As explained in part I, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty has
failed to effectively address whether the private actions and regulations
72. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (discussing that there is a split
between the approaches taken by the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S.
Senate).
73. Although there has been some overlap, some think that this has not impeded
progress in space law and can benefit it by bringing in different expertise. But see
American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
74. Id.
75. The main reason for such critique could be that international cooperation in
space law is necessary, as exemplified through numerous U.N. resolutions, but by
taking its own measures, the United States is seen as unwilling to cooperate
internationally. See Yun Zhao, Space Commercialization and the Development of
RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(July
2018),
Space
Law,
OXFORD
https://oxfordre.com/planetaryscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190647926.001.0
001/acrefore-9780190647926-e-42.
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by the United States conforms with the general principles of the OST.
Part II expands on how Article VI has failed to regulate
commercialization of space by discussing the need to adopt a
universally appealing platform to promote international cooperation.
A. Root of Success in Space Law
To understand why international cooperation in space law has
faded, it is important to consider the failures and successes of past
international space treaties. Although the OST has no real authority to
regulate space law, it has been the most successful space treaty
considering the number of nations that have accepted and ratified it.
The OST has served as the foundation for three subsequent treaties that
expanded its principles. At least three identifiable factors contributed
to the OST’s success. These factors include (1) the treaty’s intent to
promote the greater good of mankind, (2) its focus on a universally
accepted concern, and (3) its relatively loose restrictions.
1. First Factor: The OST’s Intent to Promote the Greater Good for
All of Mankind
The first factor that has made the OST successful is the intent with
which it was created. On December 19, 1966, the United Nations’ 21st
General Assembly laid out the OST’s provisions. 76 On January 27,
1967, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union
signed the treaty. 77 The General Assembly discussed its intent for the
treaty to function as an agreement to promote progress and the peaceful
use of outer space for the benefit of humankind, regardless of a nation’s
economic or scientific development. 78
When it was ratified, the OST reflected the international
community’s desire to reaffirm “the importance of international cooperation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the
76. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 1966).
77. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNOOSA,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty
.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
78. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 1966).
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importance of developing the rule of law in this new area of human
endeavor . . . .” 79
Because space exploration is intriguing and relatively new, the
United Nations has continuously recognized the potential advantages
that space has for mankind. 80 As such, the OST’s language emphasizes
the United Nations’ desire for space to be used in a peaceful way. In
essence, the treaty promotes international cooperation to reap the
potential benefits of space for “all mankind.” 81
2. Second Factor: The OST’s Provisions Addressed a Universally
Accepted Concern
The second factor that made OST a success was that it was created
as a response to Cold War Era concerns as reflected by its provisions
and purpose. 82 At the time, the world had just seen the Nazis rapidly
rise to power during the 1930’s. 83 Around the same time, the Japanese
Imperial Army overthrew the colonial powers in Asia and began to
build its own empire. 84 In the process, both of these new superpowers
committed acts that led to World War II. 85 Eventually, the majority of
the world became involved in this conflict, where misuse of power and
technology resulted in the development of a new technology: nuclear

79. Id.
80. For example, social and economic advantages can arise from the
advancement of meteorology and communications technologies in outer space. G.A.
Res. 1802 (XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962).
81. “The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I.
82. See generally Krause, supra note 6 (discussing that the OST was a reflection
of Cold Era concerns and as such the treaty focused on the specific issues of military
and science, leaving large gaps in the treaty).
83. See Wilfrid F. Knapp et al., Adolf Hitler: Dictator of Germany,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adolf-Hitler
(last updated May 3, 2019).
84. See Marius B. Jansen et al., Japan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Japan/History (last updated Oct. 24, 2019).
85. See id.; see also Knapp, supra note 83.
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energy. 86 At that time, nuclear energy had an unknown potential for
power and destruction, which is similar to the unknown potential of the
exploration and commercialization of space in today’s world.
The Cold War era created the fear of a sovereign nation, once again,
becoming too powerful. 87 Leading up to 1967 when the treaty was
drafted, there were two superpower nations, the United States and
Soviet Union, which threatened the existence of humankind with the
possibility of starting a nuclear war. 88 These two nations were the first
to harness the ability to utilize the power of space. 89
Provisions in the OST addressed the concern of a nation gaining
too much power. Specifically, the OST prevents sovereign nations
from claiming territory in space and requires that the fruits of space
exploration be used for the benefit of everyone on Earth. 90 For
example, Article II states that a nation cannot claim a celestial body as
their own sovereign territory through occupation or any other means. 91
Further, Article IV stresses the use of celestial bodies for peaceful
purposes only. 92 Notably, Article IV prohibits weapons of mass
destruction in space, specifically nuclear weapons. 93 This prohibition
includes placing weapons on celestial bodies, stationing weapons
anywhere, or putting weapons into orbit. 94
Additionally, the OST addressed Cold War concerns by promoting
human collaboration in space. The first Article in the treaty expressly
provides that activity in space and on celestial bodies should be done

86. See Robert S. Norris et al., Nuclear Weapon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon (last updated June 7, 2019).
87. The United States and Russia viewed each other with suspicion because
each was trying to prevent the other from dominating the world. See Blakemore, supra
note 9.
88. During this period, both countries poured trillions of dollars into developing
their nuclear weapons to defend themselves from each other. See id.
89. “After the 1950s the US and USSR were deep into a Space Race, adding
another arena to the Cold War competition to be the most militarily prepared.” See id.
90. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I-II.
91. Id. art. II.
92. As a result of this peaceful purpose, the “establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military [maneuvers] on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.” Id. art. IV.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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“for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . [and] without
discrimination of any kind.” 95 Article III stresses the importance of all
nations maintaining international peace and promoting cooperation. 96
Article V establishes that astronauts should be the ambassadors of all
mankind, which entails offering assistance to anyone in distress,
regardless of national origin. 97 This provision aimed to prevent the use
of space for a single nation’s benefit and instead, provide benefits for
the greater good, such as scientific progress.
The OST’s major provisions were a direct response to the fears that
formed in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War. With newfound
nuclear arsenals, the potential for destruction was high; thus, the
international community accepted the OST as a means to alleviate those
fears. 98
3. The OST is Not Overly Restrictive
The last factor attributable to the OST’s success is that it is not
overly restrictive; it allows the nations to maintain much of their
sovereignty. For instance, the OST includes a process that allows the
nations to withdraw from the treaty. 99 The OST does not bind any
nation to any sort of obligation or burden unless it decides to engage in
space activity. 100 Moreover, no international court has the express
authority to resolve a dispute under the OST, which means the parties
must negotiate to reach a resolution. 101
95. Id. art. I.
96. Id. art. III.
97. It must be noted that the article specifically states that assistance shall be
rendered to all astronauts of State Parties and does not mention non-State Parties. Id.
art. V.
98. See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 432.
99. “Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary
Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of
this notification.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. XVI.
100. The treaty lays out a few prohibitions on space activity, thus, it can be
argued that as long as a State Party is not engaged in these activities, it does not have
an affirmative duty under the treaty. Moreover, no express language in the treaty hints
at an enforcement mechanism to impose legal liability on a State Party. See id.
101. The OST does not expressly provide for an enforcement mechanism, but if
the parties cannot come to an agreement, then they can go to the International Court
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In addition, the OST does not limit the use of space to certain
activities, but instead promotes the free use of space, as long as the
activity conforms with the OST’s interests. 102 In other words, while the
OST’s provisions are not enforceable on all nations, 103 the provisions
provide each nation with a guideline for enacting their own domestic
space laws in accordance with the treaty.
The OST’s lack of binding authority prevented an international
entity from gaining too much power over the regulation of space law.
The discussion in the 21st General Assembly resolution that led to the
adoption of the OST, conveys the need to further develop ways of
building the foundation of international space law. 104 The OST’s vague
language and loose regulatory scheme left international space law
open—perhaps intentionally—to interpretation and domestic
construction. 105 Over time, this significantly affected the evolution of
space law.
Implementing these three factors allowed the United Nations to
address major Cold War concerns, and it established a collaborative
approach for utilizing the space exploration to promote the greater
good. Additionally, the liberal framing allowed nations to remain
unbound by an international authority. Overall, it instilled a universal
mentality that promoted the exploration of space for a common purpose
and in a joint effort to avoid catastrophe at a potentially unprecedented
level in outer space.
of Justice. However, that requires that the court accept the case and that the disputing
parties accept jurisdiction, which poses great difficulties for reaching a resolution.
Daniel Wilson, Legal Uncertainty May Keep Space Exploration Grounded, LAW 360
(Sept. 7, 2016, 3:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/835962/legaluncertainty-may-keep-space-exploration-grounded.
102. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I.
103. As is the case with most treaties, the OST is only enforceable against State
Parties, which the treaty makes clear by referring to State Parties often. See id. art. IXVII.
104. The General Assembly requested that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space work on the elaboration of a liability agreement for damages caused
by launched objects in outer space, study the implications of space communications,
and report progress in the following session. See G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19,
1966).
105. See generally Krause, supra note 6 (discussing the large gaps in the OST
and how countries are passing laws to address unregulated activities such as
commercial activity).
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B. OST Factors Applied to Other Treaties
As discussed above, the following factors helped the OST gain
universal acceptance: (1) its intent to promote the greater good of
mankind, (2) its focus on a universally accepted concern, and (3) its
relatively loose restrictions. The relative impact of these factors can be
measured by analyzing how they have been applied in subsequent
treaties that have shaped space law.
1. Post-OST Space Treaties That Succeeded
The OST continues to be the most widely ratified treaty among
nations, with a total of 109 parties; however, some subsequent treaties
have also been able to find relative success within the United Nations,
such as the Registration Convention with sixty-nine parties, 106 the
Liability Convention with ninety-six parties, 107 and the Rescue
Agreement with ninety-eight parties. 108 Each of these subsequent
treaties reiterated the same three factors found in the OST, which played
a significant role in their success. Each treaty’s provisions contributed
to the successful international regulation of space by elaborating on the
OST’s original provisions.
2. Post-OST Space Treaties That Failed
In 1984, the Moon Agreement marked a significant departure from
the international space community’s collaborative approach to the
regulation of space because it did not completely embody the factors
that had made other treaties successful. The Moon Agreement does
satisfy the first factor by promoting the use of space and celestial bodies

106. Status of Treaties: Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV1&chapter=24&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
107. UNOOSA, STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO
ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE AS AT 1 JANUARY 2019 5-10 (Apr. 1, 2019),
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_2019_CRP
03E.pdf.
108. Id.
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for the greater good of mankind. 109 However, the Moon Agreement
does not successfully incorporate the second and third factors.
The Moon Agreement did not satisfy the second factor, focus on a
universally accepted concern, because international interests had
drastically changed by 1984. Nuclear disarmament had led to the end
of the nuclear arms race, thereby diminishing the imminent fear of
destruction. 110 The United States was in a new era of “Reaganomics”
and free-market activity. 111 The Moon Agreement conflicted with
Western countries’ interests because commercial interests were
“lukewarm to treaty language that reserve[d] lunar resources for ‘the
common interest of all mankind.’” 112 Furthermore, the Moon
Agreement was drafted at a time when domestic legislation began to
regulate space activity, as seen by the passing of the U.S. Commercial
Space Launch Act of 1984, which allowed private companies to launch
objects into space. 113 Without the presence of a universally appealing
concern, such as the prevention of nuclear holocaust, the Moon
Agreement was undermined by polarizing interests, which hindered its
ability to gain universal acceptance.
The Moon Agreement did not satisfy the third factor, relatively
loose restrictions, because the Moon Agreement over-regulated space
activity by giving binding authority to an international entity. 114 This
would limit a sovereign nation’s ability to act in its best interest when
conducting space activity. Therefore, major spacefaring nations have
109. This first factor was met because the primary purpose of the Moon
Agreement’s provisions is to mandate that the Moon is strictly used for peaceful
purposes to benefit mankind. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, IV; see also
Mitchell, supra note 28, at 433.
110. See generally Norris, supra note 86 (discussing the historical development
of nuclear arms from their birth to the disarmament that occurred as a result of the end
of the Cold War).
111. See generally Kimberly Amadeo, What Is Reaganomics? Did It Work?,
THE BALANCE (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/reaganomics-did-itwork-would-it-today-3305569 (discussing the economic policy of Reaganomics and
its main tenets).
112. See Krause, supra note 6.
113. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984).
114. Throughout the treaty, it is stated that State Parties must give notice to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations before embarking on certain activities. See
Moon Treaty, supra note 25; see also Krause, supra note 6 (discussing how the OST
did not address the issue of how a dispute would be resolved).
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declined to establish international space law and have instead focused
their efforts on domestic space law. 115 Essentially, the Moon
Agreement strayed from the three factors that made the OST and other
treaties successful, thus failing to encourage international collaboration
and shifting the responsibilities of space regulation to national entities.
3. Antarctic Treaty
One treaty that has been compared to the OST is the Antarctic
Treaty, which is often considered a blueprint to the OST. 116 The
Antarctic Treaty is an international treaty that governs how the
signatory nations are to use the continent of Antarctica. 117 Like the
OST, the Antarctic Treaty has gained wide acceptance among the
international community, with fifty-three parties to the treaty. 118 The
treaty has been considered a success, perhaps because it contains the
same factors present in the OST.
First, the Antarctic Treaty promotes a peaceful agreement between
nations to allow unrestricted access to Antarctica for purposes of
conducting scientific research. 119 In retrospect, “the Antarctic Treaty
is seen as one of the most successful international treaties because the
international cooperation it fostered has led to significant scientific and
environmental discoveries, such as the depletion of the atmospheric
ozone layer.” 120 Thus, like the OST, which promotes the use of outer
space for the good of mankind, the Antarctic Treaty promotes the use
of Antarctica for discoveries that can benefit all.

115. The most notable space treaties were enacted in the 1960s and 1970s. See
American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
116. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 436.
117. See generally Antarctic Treaty, June 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794 [hereinafter
Antarctic Treaty].
118. This argument is based on the fact that major spacefaring nations like the
United States and Russia are State Parties to the treaty. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE
ANTARCTIC
TREATY
(Apr.
22,
2019),
https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/141-Antarctic-Treaty.pdf.
119. The main restrictions on access are in regard to purely military activities.
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 117, art I.
120. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 437.
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Second, the Antarctic Treaty was drafted in the late 1950s, a few
short years before the OST’s provisions were conceived. 121 The
Antarctic Treaty reflected many of the OST’s same concerns, such as
the Cold War concerns regarding peaceful military purposes, scientific
research, and cooperation among nations. 122
Lastly, the Antarctic Treaty was successful because like the OST,
it was not overly restrictive, as it allowed sovereign nations to utilize
Antarctica for scientific research and progress. In fact, it was less
restrictive than the OST because it also allowed for territorial claims,
unlike the OST, which included a non-appropriation clause. 123
4. The OST Factors and Article VI
As discussed, Article VI of the OST has long served as the basis for
domestic and international commercial regulation of outer space.
However, Article VI has failed to provide guidance needed to regulate
the exponential advancement of the commercialization of space. In
recent years, the application of Article VI to commercial actors has
undermined the effectiveness of the three factors.
First, Article VI does not promote the general welfare of mankind
because it focuses on governments’ right to control commercial space
activities, 124 which is generally seen as self-serving. This conflicts with
the OST’s original purpose of serving the greater good of mankind. The
shift toward commercial benefits, which by their nature serve the
interests of a few, may arouse suspicions about the true intentions
behind Article VI regulations.
Second, space regulation no longer focuses on Cold War concerns.
Contemporary concerns center on how to regulate the rapid increase of

121. However, the treaty did not enter into force until June 23, 1961. See
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
https://2009Antarctic
Treaty,
U.S
2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
122. See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 436-37 (discussing that besides promoting
the peaceful use of Antarctica, there are prohibitions on nuclear testing and waste
disposal).
123. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 117, art. IV; see also Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 2, art. II.
124. The OST does not mention private actors. Instead, responsibility and
liability for space activity by “non-governmental entities” fall on the relevant State
Party. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI.
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space commercialization. 125
Commerce in space is inherently
competitive and appears to be tailored toward private financial gain. 126
As competition increases, so do differences in how to interpret Article
VI and its applicability to private actors.
Lastly, there is vast disagreement on how much regulation to allow
through Article VI. In particular, one question remains unanswered:
Who should have the international authority to enforce provisions or
settle disputes? Some advocate for a strict interpretation of Article VI
that supports creating a binding authority able to directly control
commercial space actors. 127 Others have argued for a looser
interpretation that supports promoting free market activity. 128 As a
result of these conflicting interpretations, the restrictive nature of
Article VI remains unclear. International cooperation in space law was
achieved under the original intent of the OST. When it was created, the
OST’s goal was to address concerns stemming from the Cold War. The
shift toward regulating private actors by using Article VI as a basis has
proved to be ineffective and has weakened the factors that have made
past treaties successful.
The three OST factors seem to be essential in treaties that have
succeeded. The most successful international agreements have been
based on accomplishing feats for the greater good of mankind. A strong
platform that does not contain the same flaws as Article VI is both
urgent and necessary to address the lack of international regulation in
the face of a new space era.
III. PLANETARY PROTECTION: A NEW PLATFORM
A different platform, rather than Article VI, can create more
uniformity in the international realm of space law by reinforcing the

125. Specifically, the concern is about regulating resource extraction and new
activities in space. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
126. “A decision was made [by Congress] to put priority on nurturing the
commercial space flight industry and a program was put into place to help commercial
companies that wanted to get into human space flight by giving them a customerferrying ISS crews.” See Lerner, supra note 45.
127. The previous U.S. FAA administration followed a strict interpretation in
seeking to regulate everything in space. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
128. See id. (arguing that not everything needs to be regulated in space just
because it is a new and unregulated field).
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OST factors. Regulation of commercial space activity through Article
VI has resulted in different interpretations on how Article VI should be
applied. It will be more effective to create a different, more universally
appealing platform than to attempt to reconcile the different
interpretations of Article VI. The goal will be to reestablish the OST’s
factors and promote collaboration among the international community
in order to extend the OST to regulate commercial space activity.
Planetary protection is one platform that may accomplish this goal.
A. Planetary Protection: Background
Planetary protection is an emerging issue that needs to be addressed
in the commercial space industry. Increased activity in space raises
concern about the planetary protection of Earth and other celestial
bodies. It should be noted that “planetary protection has . . . gained a
higher profile” because the space industry is expecting exponential
growth within the next decade. 129
1. Planetary Protection Issues
Several planetary protection issues arise from the emergence of the
commercial space industry. One issue is planetary contamination,
which is the contamination of celestial bodies, asteroids, and space by
humans. 130
Another concern is that space actors may bring
contamination back into Earth, such as microbes, chemicals, and
radiation–-all of which can be detrimental to Earth’s safety. 131 Other

129. As companies become serious about sending humans to Mars and beyond,
the issue has gained much attention, specifically in terms of safety and survival. Marc
Kaufman, Planetary Protection Is a “Wicked” Problem, NASA (May 17, 2017),
https://astrobiology.nasa.gov/news/planetary-protection-is-a-wicked-problem/.
130. “If someone proposes to mine an asteroid or the Moon, we should regulate
that activity, for example, to prevent contamination of these celestial bodies (which is
an obligation under the treaty) and also back-contamination on Earth (if anything is
brought back to Earth). We need to ensure that the activity is safe and that it complies
with the treaty.” See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33; see also Kaufman, supra
note 129.
131. See generally New Report Addresses Limiting Interplanetary
Contamination During Human Missions, NASA (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/new-report-addresses-limiting-interplanetarycontamination-during-human-missions (stating that “‘[i]t’s critical to establish the
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issues include harming the environment of celestial bodies and space
debris by littering Earth’s orbit. 132
2. Current Regulations for Planetary Protection
Current planetary protection regulations are insufficient to prevent
planetary contamination because they do not have any binding
international authority. Under the OST and the Liability Convention,
indemnification laws hold states accountable for any damages caused
by their actors. 133 However, this merely establishes liability and it does
not provide any preventative measures. Additionally, the OST only
holds states liable for the damages caused by their own private actors,
which does not encourage international cooperation in protecting the
celestial environment.
In 2002, the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) created
international guidelines for planetary protection. 134 COSPAR is an
international agency that promotes scientific research of space on an
international level. 135 It serves as an objective and scientific forum for
the exchange of information regarding space research. 136 It has been
acknowledged as an agency that helps establish cooperation between
quantitative requirements now, that engineers need to follow while designing humanrated systems for travel beyond Earth orbit’”).
132. “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid
their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter, and where necessary, shall
adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2,
art. IX; see also G. KMINEK, C. CONLEY, V. HIPKIN, H. YANO & COSPAR,
COSPAR’S
PLANETARY
PROTECTION
POLICY
13
(2017),
https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicydecember_2017.pdf [hereinafter
COSPAR POLICY].
133. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII; Liability Convention, supra
note 22, art. V.
134. “NASA proposed a consolidation of various COSPAR decisions on
Planetary Protection into a single policy document (first time since 1964), which was
accomplished in 2002.” CATHARINE A. CONLEY, WHAT IS PLANETARY PROTECTION?
14 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/ssbsite/documents/
webpage/ssb_178093.pdf.
135. About, COSPAR, https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/about (last visited Oct. 30,
2019).
136. Id.
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the East and West in space. 137 COSPAR created a Planetary Protection
Policy that lays out non-binding guidelines for planetary protection. 138
The policy itself states that it is intended only to be a guideline for
nations to follow. 139
NASA, the European Space Agency, and the Japanese Aerospace
Exploration Agency have established their own system of planetary
protection policies to meet the international guidelines for planetary
protection under the OST. 140 However, some countries have not
adopted similar policies to regulate their commercial use. With
increased technological and financial feasibility for private actors to get
into space, there is a concern that some private actors might not follow
the COSPAR guidelines for planetary protection, unless their respective
governments directly regulate their activities. With no binding
international standard for planetary protection, Earth (and celestial
bodies in space) may be vulnerable to those nations that do not follow
binding regulatory guidelines.
3. Need for Regulation
The lack of binding regulation for commercial space actors and
their activities can detrimentally affect the success of a planetary
protection platform. 141 Experts have highlighted the urgency of
developing a better and more strategic plan for planetary protection,

137. Id.
138. “COSPAR maintains and promulgates this planetary protection policy for
the reference of spacefaring nations, both as an international standard on procedures
to avoid organic-constituent and biological contamination in space exploration, and
to provide accepted guidelines in this area to guide compliance with the wording of
this UN Space Treaty and other relevant international agreements.” See COSPAR
POLICY, supra note 132, at 13.
139. In pertinent part, the introduction to the policy states that this is meant “to
provide advice on these issues [of extraterrestrial contamination].” See id. at 12.
140. Planetary
Protection,
NASA,
https://sma.nasa.gov/smadisciplines/planetary-protection (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
141. See Leonard David, NASA’s Planetary Protection Policies Need to Be
Updated, Report Finds, SPACE (July 3, 2018), https://www.space.com/41060-nasaplanetary-protection-policies-questioned.html (arguing that in the absence of a
regulatory agency in the United States, NASA needs to update its planetary protection
policies in order to address private actor exploration of space).
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indicating that “private-sector space exploration activities are another
reason why planetary protection policies need re-examination.” 142
B. How Planetary Protection Will Function
An international agreement should be established to develop a
Planetary Protection Agency (PPA), deriving its power from Article
IX 143 of the OST, to address the lack of regulation for both planetary
protection and commercialization. The PPA would ignore political
considerations, like COSPAR, and would have the ability to regulate
dangerous space activities. Further, the PPA would impose provisions
to ensure planetary protection from the space activities of commercial
and state actors and to avoid harmful contamination in space and on
Earth. Scientists educated in planetary protection would be in charge
of running the PPA. The scope of the PPA’s regulation would
encompass all space activity by all actors in space without
distinguishing between state or private actors. Thus, this regulation will
protect space from dangerous policies that are influenced by differing
economic or political ideologies.
1. Article IX as a Basis for Regulation
A close analogy of how PPA regulation would work is how the U.S.
Congress uses its Commerce Power to regulate private commercial
action in the United States. One of the powers given to Congress by
the U.S. Constitution is the power to “regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” 144
This power is frequently cited as the basis for Congress enacting
legislation. 145 One way Congress may regulate private commercial
142. Id.
143. Article IX provides that states “shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, . . . to avoid their harmful
contamination and . . . adverse changes in the environment of the Earth.” See Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. The “Commerce Clause has become the constitutional basis for a
significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and it
currently represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional
powers.” KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32844, THE POWER TO
REGULATE COMMERCE: LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER 1 (2014).
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activity is if that activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 146 Similarly, the PPA should be able to regulate the activity
of sovereign nations and private citizens involved in space activity if
that activity presents a substantial risk of harm to planetary protection.
So, how would the PPA justify this authority? It would begin at the
domestic level. Initially, the OST only applied to state actors’ activities,
but Articles VI and VII of the OST were expanded in the 1972 Liability
Convention to require that each nation take responsibility for any harm
caused by its private actors while exploring space. 147 Regardless of a
narrow or broad interpretation of Article VI, there is agreement that if
a space activity is dangerous, then it should be regulated to prevent
harm. 148
The PPA should impose liability on states for the harmful actions
of their private citizens that cause any damage to Earth or other celestial
bodies. This provision would add to Article IX of the OST, which
ensures that states “shall pursue studies of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, . . . to avoid their harmful
contamination and . . . adverse changes in the environment of the
Earth.” 149 Because governments have an interest in not being held
liable for the harm caused by their private citizens, there should be some
balance of power to allow sovereign states to regulate private activity
in space. By controlling their citizens’ activities in space, governments
would likely regulate space commercialization in a way that reduces the
risk of states being held liable.
Another concern to consider when framing a new regulatory
scheme would be how and what power is delegated to a binding
international entity. Under Article IX, if a nation believes it may be
conducting dangerous activities in space that might harm the planet, the
nation must “undertake appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with any such activity or experiment.” 150 This same
procedure could be helpful in promoting nations to take responsibility

146. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941).
147. Compare Liability Convention, supra note 22, art. II, with Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI-VII.
148. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (discussing how rockets can be
dangerous because of their high explosive yield and as such should be regulated).
149. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
150. Id.
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in regulating their own commercial actors. It would allow the PPA to
serve as the appropriate international consultation before nations could
proceed with activities in space. 151 Thus, the PPA’s essential function
would be to preside over space activity to ensure state and private actors
are in conformity with its regulations.
2. Scope of Regulation
Space regulation is a dangerous enterprise. Space contains
untapped potential, and any entity with an ability to regulate it can raise
serious risks. However, not regulating the potential can be just as
dangerous. With the possibility that there may be abuse of regulatory
power, how can we ensure the effective implementation of regulations?
As discussed, commerce power is very broad and gives the U.S.
Congress the ability to regulate a wide range of private conduct. Thus,
to be effective, the PPA’s regulatory power should be tailored to
specific issues that affect planetary protection. For example, when an
entity plans to transport a massive amount of an unstable chemical
element through the ozone layer, such as uranium, the PPA should have
the authority to regulate such activity only to the extent that would
prevent planetary protection from being at risk. This means that the
PPA’s regulatory power must be narrowly tailored to bring the activity
in conformity with the PPA’s planetary protection regulations. Thus, if
the entity’s activity conforms with safety standard regulations, the
PPA’s regulatory power stops, giving the actors the permission to
proceed. Under the above-mentioned scenario, the PPA would not be
able to regulate the shipment of uranium for political or economic
reasons, such as preventing a nuclear arms buildup or stabilizing the
global market, as long as the shipment conforms with PPA’s safety
standard regulations.
Therefore, on one hand, the PPA should address sovereign nations’
interest in conducting space activity with relative freedom. On the other
hand, the PPA’s main interest in ensuring planetary protection must not
be jeopardized. These interests must be balanced by the PPA when
regulating a certain type of activity. Essentially, regulations must not
be so burdensome as to deter innovation and exploration.

151. Essentially, the PPA would approve or disapprove an activity based on
some kind of study or research. See id.
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3. Burden of Proof
Another issue involves determining who should carry the burden of
proof. Does the PPA have to show that there is a need for an immediate
planetary protection? Or does the challenger of the regulation have to
show that there is no compelling need for planetary protection or that
the regulation is unreasonably burdensome?
The PPA should be given self-executing power to regulate space
activities because it is in everyone’s best interest to protect the earth
from the potentially devastating and irreparable harm.
The
environmental harm could potentially be irreversible, so immediate
protection is necessary. However, there should be procedural
safeguards in place to prevent the PPA from gaining too much power.
For instance, once a regulation is challenged, the challenger, in order to
satisfy its initial burden, should only be required to present a prima facie
case that the law is unreasonably burdensome or discriminatory. To
prevent the PPA from gaining too much power, and to promote the free
use of space, the challenger’s burden should be low. Once the
challenger meets the prima facie burden, the burden should shift back
to the PPA to prove the law’s validity. The PPA’s justification for
regulation must be based on an environmental rationale because unlike
speculative, ideological, and complex economic and political
platforms, 152 environmental arguments can be proven with concrete and
scientific evidence. This will also prevent the PPA from becoming a
political or economic branch of spacefaring nations.
C. Why Planetary Protection Will Provide a More Effective Platform
for Regulation
The OST’s factors, which once fostered cooperation in
international space law, may be strengthened by extending the OST’s
regulation of space activity through Article IX to encompass both
private and state actors.

152. See Bruce R. Scott, The Political Economy of Capitalism 4, 16 (Harvard
Bus.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
07-037,
2006),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-037.pdf.
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1. Intent to Promote the Greater Good for All of Mankind
Much like the original intent of the OST, Article IX can help extend
regulation to commercial actors by having the same intention of
promoting the interests of the greater good. Thus, the regulating entity,
the PPA, must ensure that it does not follow any self-serving
commercial or political interest because planetary protection is better
achieved if it only considers the interests of the greater good.
Therefore, the entity’s regulations will be enacted for the greater
good of mankind because they will protect the planet from an
immediate threat, and they will continue the beneficial exploration and
use of space. Much like the Cold War concerns over nuclear
destruction, planetary protection is an issue that may threaten our very
existence.
2. Planetary Protection Is a Universally Accepted Concern
Article IX provides an environmental platform 153 to reestablish
international cooperation through a universally accepted concern.
Addressing Cold War concerns fostered the OST’s original success, but
cooperation faded as international interests transitioned from a focus on
international peace to a desire for commercial success in space. 154 An
environmental platform of planetary protection may be the universally
appealing concern that the international community needs to reestablish
cooperation.
The millennial 155 and younger generations are more inclined to
respond to regulation through an environmental platform such as
planetary protection rather than through Article VI. Article VI has not
been effective in regulating commercial space activity; it has instead
generated controversy about its proper interpretation. 156 Millennials

153. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
154. See generally Krause, supra note 6 (discussing that a large reason for this
transition was the lack of a binding authority and the OST’s silence on commercial
actors).
155. A millennial is “a person born in the 1980s or 1990s.” Millennial,
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamMERRIAM-WEBSTER
webster.com/dictionary/millennial (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
156. See generally American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (addressing that there
are potential problems with both the under and over regulation of space activity).
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may be more open to regulating state and private actors if it is narrowly
tailored to an environmental platform, as seen by their attitude toward
issues like climate change.
A . . . study, released in March by Pew, found that 65 percent of all
U.S. millennials say both that there is solid evidence of global
warming and attribute this primarily to human activity—the only
generation for which this viewpoint has a clear majority. And an MIT
study found that millennials self-identify as climate conscious, with
most believing they care more about protecting the environment than
older generations. 157

Millennials concern regarding environmental issues is similar to the
apocalyptic mentality people had during the Cold War Era over nuclear
destruction. The Millennial generation is important because it may very
well be the first generation to build the new era of the commercial space
industry. Reports indicate that there will be a substantial growth in the
commercial space industry within the next decade. 158 Since this new
era is in the near future, regulation is urgent.
Environmental concerns were compelling enough to help the
Antarctic Treaty find success in the twentieth century by addressing
concerns over “the depletion of the atmospheric ozone layer.” 159
Arguably, these environmental concerns are even more compelling and
accepted in 2019 among Millennials who will likely take over the new
era of the commercial space industry.
3. New Regulations Would Not Be Overly Restrictive
Much like the OST, this proposal is also not overly restrictive for
an agency that regulates all space activity, including state and private
actors. OST’s Article IX power is an extremely narrow regulatory
scheme designed to address a very specific type of issue. The PPA’s
environmental platform only has one interest: the preservation of life
157. Madeleine Cuff, Eco-operation: Why Your Climate Strategy Is Central to
(May
29,
2018),
Wooing
Millennials,
GREENBIZ
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/eco-operation-why-your-climate-strategy-centralwooing-millennials.
158. See BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.
159. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 437.
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on Earth and other celestial bodies. Unlike a purely environmental
justification, commercialization is inherently prone to political and
economic bias; thus, any economic and political justification has been
met with scrutiny. 160 This single planetary protection justification
contains less bias and leaves no room for disagreement—Who doesn’t
want to save the planet?
Like the successful Antarctic Treaty, experts and scientists will run
the PPA. Science based decisions will allow these experts to prove their
justifications through scientific evidence rather than through
ideological debate over interpretation, as is the case with Article VI.
For this reason, the PPA would have the ultimate burden to prove its
regulation is in conformity with the OST. If there is scientific evidence
to justify a regulation, the PPA should be able to easily present the
supporting evidence. Therefore, this planetary protection platform is
tailored to be less restrictive because the PPA has to meet the ultimate
burden of showing that its execution of power is justified through
scientific evidence. This will prevent the PPA from wielding excessive
regulatory authority.
CONCLUSION
The rapid increase of space commercialization makes the risk of
harm to planetary protection more realistic; therefore, it must be
addressed. I hope that drawing attention to this risk will rally the next
generation into action, especially given that the Millennial generation
will be the main player in the new space age and will have expressed
its appeal for environmental platforms.
Much like the OST, the success of this new platform will depend
on addressing the concerns of our era. The world witnessed how the
OST aligned with many Cold War concerns. That alignment helped
explain the OST’s nearly universal acceptance as the foundation of
space law. Now, the environmental justification for creating the
Planetary Protection Agency may lead to similar success. Admittedly,

160. Describing investors in the space industry as “very successful business
people, who are not doing it as a science experiment but because they see a
commercial return.” See Jane Bird, Commercialisation of Space Is New Final
Frontier, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/fcc72e0c-756411e4-a1a9-00144feabdc0; see also Scott, supra note 152, at 4, 16.
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it is an optimistic proposal, but one founded on the lessons we have
learned from the successes and failures we have witnessed.
Ross Harper*
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